Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

From Euroscepticism to Resistance to European Integration: An Interdisciplinary Perspective

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ABSTRACT *This article aims at contributing to the ongoing academic debate about European integration. It stresses the need for an interdisciplinary approach rooted in history and political science. The argument is twofold. Most of the existing literature overlooks the historical dimension of contention over the making of Europe and implicitly makes it a contemporary phenomenon defined as Euroscepticism. This, it is argued, has led to some major analytical deadlocks. Consequently, it is necessary to reframe the debate through the notion of resistances to Europe. Resistances can be defined as manifestations of hostility towards one (or several) aspect(s) of European integration perceived as a threat with respect to one's values. This notion, this paper suggests, is particularly adequate to the study of past and present contention over European integration, which is highlighted with various empirical examples.*

KEY WORDS: Euroscepticism, resistances, European integration, interdisciplinary, history

Introduction

The history of the EU as a set of institutions has mainly been about avoiding conflict. The *modi operandi* prevailing within the European institutions have indeed consistently favoured compromise over conflict, consensus over voting, grand coalitions over majority, governance over government, conventional over unconventional forms of political participation, etc. However, it is clear today that the political processes at stake with regard to European integration are at odds with this picture. Decision makers have had to deal over the last eight years with an ongoing constitutional crisis which has given birth to existential issues concerning the Union as a whole. In order to explain the development of political conflict over the EU, many scholars have embraced the assumption that the debates over the Treaty of Maastricht have triggered the end of a 'permissive consensus' which had so far prevailed (Lindberg & Steingold, 1970; Percheron, 1991; Franklin et al., 1995; Norris, 1997; Dyson, 2002; Gabel & Anderson, 2004; Hix, 2005; Hooghe & Marks,

2009).[1] The broad picture is that the end of the 'permissive consensus' has given rise to mass-level (Eichenberg & Dalton, 2007; De Vries & van Kersbergen, 2007) as well as party-based Euroscepticism (Taggart, 1998; Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2001, 2003, 2008; Sitter, 2001; Kopecky & Mudde, 2002; Harmsen & Spiering, 2004; Hooghe, 2007). The related increase both of the competences of the EU itself and of politicization of European matters necessarily draws a picture full of contrasts concerning the pre- and post-Maastricht periods. The acceleration in holding referenda over treaties and membership as well as the rise of scholarship about new member states from Central and Eastern Europe has also provided more empirical grounds for studying contention over the EU.

However, we think the 'permissive consensus'/Euroscepticism conceptual couple is somewhat misleading. Recent research has provided evidence that general support for integration was not lower in 2002 than at the beginning of the 1970s: in that sense, there was not a greater consensus prevailing at that time than there is today (Down & Wilson, 2008). The authors argue that the Treaty of Maastricht has had a qualitative rather than a quantitative impact on support for Europe, since it brought about a dispersion and differentiation of opinions over European integration rather than an increase in opposition. Other scholars have also put in perspective the supposed dramatic decrease of support while showing that it was more related to some specific issues, such as the EMU, whereas support remains strong for EU action in other areas (Eichenberg & Dalton, 2007). This paper therefore draws on the assumption that, although visibility of contention over integration has unarguably increased since the early 1990s, European integration has always been intrinsically contentious.

The second assumption is that public opinions are not the best empirics to study contention over integration, especially in an historical perspective. First, data is very scarce apart from the – often criticized – Eurobarometer, and even more so for the period prior to its creation in 1974. Second, studies of public opinion have generated contradictory interpretations, especially in relation to referendum results. While the votes against the European constitutional treaty in France, the Netherlands or in Ireland have been seen as protests against current developments of the EU, survey data show that citizens in these countries are mostly 'pro-Europeans'. Some scholars have also questioned the relevance of considering referendum results for an indicator of support towards the EU (Franklin et al., 1995). Third, studies of mass-level support for integration have highlighted variables – material interests (Gabel, 1998), cognitive capacities (Inglehardt, 1970; Cautrès & Grunberg, 2007) or national identity (Duchesne & Frognier, 2002; McLaren, 2002) – which are mostly *not* specific to EU integration. On one hand, support for the EU has a strong elitist dimension (Costa & Magnette, 2007), which reflects to some extent the mechanisms for political participation at national level (Reungoat, forthcoming). On the other hand, views about the EU are strongly connected to the attitudes towards the broader boundary opening due to globalization (Kriesi et al., 2008; Schild & Hessen, 2009). Furthermore, recent research has demonstrated that, rather than conflict or opposition, citizen's attitude towards EU integration display apathy and indifference (Delmotte, 2007; Duchesne & Van Ingelgom, 2009). Hence, we believe that the realm of politics is a better ground for studying how conflict over European integration is articulated in the public sphere. Politics shall be understood in the broad sense, i.e. not only as party politics, but also including contentious politics and all relevant civil

society organizations tending to mobilize citizens and public opinion over EU issues. This approach has been used very convincingly by Daniel C. Thomas (2006). He studied in a historical perspective how the nature of the European Community as an organization based on democracy and human rights – hence solely open to democratic regimes – brought about contentious debates driven by non-state actors, as early as in 1962 when Franco's Spain applied for membership.

This article aims at contributing to the ongoing academic debate about contention over European integration. It argues that there is a need for reframing the debate through the notion of *resistances* to EU integration in an interdisciplinary perspective rooted in history and political science. Resistances can be defined as manifestations of hostility towards one (or several) aspect(s) of European integration perceived as a threat with respect to one's values. The demonstration proceeds as follows. The first section critically assesses the existing literature. While historiography of European integration has overlooked manifestations of conflict, political science literature over Euroscepticism has led to an analytical deadlock. The second section puts forward the notion of resistances and explains what analytical assets it offers in respect to Euroscepticism. The notion is then applied to few empirical examples of past and present resistances to European integration.

The Deficient Theorization of Conflict over EU Integration in History and Political Science

A Partial History of European Integration

Looking back at the historiography of European integration, two main features come to the fore. The first, the writing of European history since 1945 and the writing of European integration are difficult to match up. The second, obviously linked to the first, is related to the absence of a social history of European integration. These two failing points have led scholars to overlook conflicts over EU integration or to simplify them. Therefore, a brief reassessment of the federalist narrative and the intergovernmental history show how weak academic history is regarding resistances to European integration. By contrast, we suggest that more recent and contradictory readings of integration history reflect to a certain extent the various normative understandings of Europe which are inherent to the integration project since its origins.

Historians have not avoided contention over the creation of Europe but contention has been mainly reduced to intergovernmental disputes or to the opposition between leading figures (see for instance Giacone & Olivi, 2007; Dinan, 2004; Bitsch, 2008). The Cold War context and the over-generalization 'yes/no' inferred by opinion polls and referenda have contributed to neglect conflicts over the European integration process. Yet, as we suggest in the last section of this article, some current contentions share characteristics with past conflicts. The federalist narrative, which dominated the European historiography from the 1940s to the 1970s, generated a linear and finalist history of European integration. This historical lecture tended to play down conflicts and breakdowns while over-emphasizing the continuity of integration through a functionalist perspective. Most prominently represented by Walter Lipgens, the federalist narrative stigmatized intergovernmentalism and its leading figures such

as Winston Churchill and Ernest Bevin (Dinan, 2006, p. 300). Such a writing of history, dominated by legends of great men (Milward, 2000, p. 318), might be seen as a *Legitimationswissenschaft* where resistances are rejected in the anti-European camp and hence neglected. Of course, the failure of the European Defence Community, the 'empty chair crisis' appears in books devoted to the history of European integration. But the social and political forces carrying resistances to integration are not considered and there is no reference book which tackles the issue with a broad perspective. The main problem seems to be heuristic. The history of resistances to European integration should not merely consider clear oppositions but rather evaluate how the EU was represented. This difficulty for historians to apprehend the social part of European integration is revealing. Indeed, when a Belgian journalist asked T. Judt (2005) why he neglected the European integration question in his famous book *Postwar Europe*, he replied that Europeans were late in realizing this (*Le Soir*, 26 December 2008).

However, the historiography did not end with the federalist narrative and challenging interpretations emerged in the 1980s. The upheaval triggered by *The European Rescue of the Nation-State* (Milward, 2000) changed the vision over the European history and initiated a new historiographical current epitomized by A. Moravcsik. While focusing on state-centric debates, Moravcsik pointed out how 'commercial interest alone determined the preferences of the big member states' (Dinan, 2006, p. 317). For historians, his theory was problematic, especially in the use of historical sources. Beyond the methodological controversy, should this lecture of European integration history have brought light into the importance states have in this process, it cannot help to apprehend past and present resistances within states.

While it has long been interpreted as the State vs. Europe dichotomy, the history of European integration is increasingly considered in terms of opposition between regulation and federalization, on the one hand, and market liberalization, on the other (Bussière et al., 2006). More than ever, the essence, the origins and the developments of the integration process are a cause for historical disagreements with an obvious normative dimension. According to Jacques Delors, the great success achieved by the European Coal and Steel Community was to match up two economic perspectives: economic planning and liberalism (Poidevin & Spierenburg, 1993, p. ix). The 'Janus face' of Europe (Jabko, 2006, ch. 9) gave rise to divergent interpretations of European integration history. This historical hiatus is clearly illustrated by two recent studies devoted to the history of European integration. In his polemic *European Integration, 1950–2003*, J. Gillingham (2003) tears the federalist narrative into pieces and criticizes the institutional influence of Jean Monnet (Dinan, 2006, p. 319). His theory rests on the confrontation between state control embodied by Jean Monnet, Walter Hallstein and Jacques Delors, on the one hand, and enforcement of the free market represented by Ludwig Erhard and Margaret Thatcher, on the other. According to him, the Treaty of Rome should not be seen as the '*relance*' of the integration process but rather as its true impulsion. In the opposite camp and in a more classical vein, R. Leboutte highlights the relationship between the Keynesian economic theory and the first steps of European integration (2008, pp. 37–48). While J. Gillingham insists on the predominant role played by the market forces, R. Leboutte stresses that the national as well as the early European economic policies were inspired by the Keynesian views.

In a nutshell, the discussion about the historiography of European integration highlights two things. The first is that little attention has been devoted to political and social resistances to EU integration within and beyond national states. The second is that there is no possible univocal interpretation of the essence of the European project which displays contradictory features. This point has been largely overlooked by political scientists interested in contention over European integration. Indeed, as we shall see below, studies of Euroscepticism rely more or less explicitly on an essentialist vision of Europe, hence of the resistances to it.

Euroscepticism: An Exhausted Notion

While many authors have criticized the term Euroscepticism, few of them have consistently elaborated their criticism. The advocacy for an alternative approach can only rely on a robust analysis of the deficiencies of this notion and its uses. It is therefore important to state explicitly why we think Euroscepticism constitutes a theoretical deadlock with respect to the complexity of the contention which characterizes European integration. Three arguments are formulated: i) the lack of a consistent definition goes with an empirical focus on political parties; ii) the term in the historical context in which it was forged, which has an influence over its meaning and makes it inappropriate to historical analysis; iii) it carries an exclusively negative connotation thus making research very normative.

To begin, the semantic proliferation on Euroscepticism is evidence for the absence of a unified and consistent definition of the term, in spite of great work on typologies by authors dealing with political parties. The purpose here is not to give a detailed review of the abundant Euroscepticism literature, but rather to put forward a critical assessment of the hegemonic theorization of contention over European integration. While it is often used for public opinion, especially in the press, the notion of Euroscepticism was mainly elaborated by scholars of political parties. Their work is all the more interesting for us as we concentrate on organized and institutionalized actors. The seminal distinction made by P. Taggart and A. Szczerbiak (2001, 2003) between hard ('principled') and soft ('qualified') Euroscepticism has paved the way for a vivid debate over the taxonomic conceptualization of Euroscepticism. P. Kopecky and C. Mudde (2002) are A. Szczerbiak and P. Taggart's most famous challengers and they have criticized especially three points: i) the too broad definition of soft Euroscepticism, ii) the implicit confusion between the EU in general and the 'EU as it is'; iii) the vagueness of the criterion for distinguishing soft and hard Euroscepticism. They have subsequently elaborated a two-dimensional typology based on the distinction between diffuse and specific support to European integration. This in turn stimulated A. Szczerbiak and P. Taggart to refine their own concepts (2003). This debate is closely related to the identification of the main driver of party-based Euroscepticism: either party position in the national party system (Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2003; Sitter, 2001) or ideology (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002; Hooghe et al., 2004). Other authors have put forward a gradualist approach resulting in categories of Euroscepticism which are positions on continuums (Rovny, 2004; Pilet & Van Haute, 2007). These typologies tend to differentiate between the different degrees of the phenomenon without formulating a satisfactory definition. This can lead to classification of very different objects in the same categories.

According to Giovanni Sartori (1970), a typology should rather distinguish between the categories (difference in kind) previous to a differentiation within the categories (difference in degree). While the '-ism' notion implies a substantialist theorization, typologies display a clear lack in establishing satisfactory criteria in order to distinguish between different types of Euroscepticism. The distinction between 'the principle of European integration' and 'the EU as it is' or 'as it is developing' (according to its trajectory) (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002; Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2008, p. 3) seems impossible to operationalize.

Another group of scholars of Euroscepticism is less interested in typologies but rather in how the phenomenon is rooted and constructed within national political spaces. Cultural and historical variables are emphasized (Harmsen & Spiering, 2004; Lacroix & Coman, 2007; Neumayer et al., 2008), while the focus mainly lies on 'national discourses of European integration' (Harmsen, 2008). Since Euroscepticism is characterized by national features, the definition of it is implicitly idiosyncratic. Since every author uses a different definition, one may wonder about the possibility of a comparative approach. While the focus sometimes lies in intellectuals or on the press, the empirical ground remains strongly bound to political parties. Numerous authors unsatisfied with the notion of Euroscepticism forge neologisms which seem more appropriate to particular aspects of their object or of the context under study: 'Euro-indifference' (Delmotte, 2007), 'Europhobia' (Rozenberg, 2007), 'Eurorealism' (Neumayer, 2007), 'critical Europeanists' (Della Porta, 2006) or 'Eurocynicism' (Krouwel & Abst, 2007), etc. Being either a non-specified state of public opinion or focused exclusively on political parties, the term Euroscepticism proves to be inappropriate for a whole range of organized actors. Few authors have so far dared talk about Eurosceptic parliaments, unions or consumer associations. Does this mean that these actors do not question the modalities or the trajectory of European integration?

The second weakness of Euroscepticism comes from the fact that its use in political science is bound to overlap – at least partially – with its use in common language. This is problematic because its meaning remains linked to the historical context where it appeared, namely Great Britain in the late 1980s. It was then forged in the press and used to name those opposing the United Kingdom's membership in the European Economic Community, also called 'anti-marketeers' (Harmsen & Spiering, 2004, p. 14). Later, with the debate over the ratification of the Maastricht treaty, the sense of Euroscepticism enlarges to oppositions against further transfer of competences to the European level and fears about losing national identity and sovereignty. In the second half of the 1990s, hostility towards European integration seems to come from all parts with notably the coming of age of the alterglobalist movement which considers the EU as the 'Trojan horse of neo-liberal globalization'. In some countries, more specific themes appear. In Germany, for instance, hostility towards integration is fuelled by the introduction of the Euro (Decker & Hartleb, 2008).

Scholars therefore have to face the following paradox: they start to investigate and elaborate Euroscepticism at a point where its use has been terribly trivialized but its meaning remains closely related to its origin: the early 1990s. In this context, it has mainly had a radical connotation (Spiering, 2004) related to nationalism and sovereignty. Indeed, the overwhelming majority of academic work on

Euroscepticism has dealt with actors of the right or far right and advocates of the nation against Europe. Rather than frontal opposition of anti-Europeans, we arguably claim that the most important empirical question today is qualified criticism towards the modalities of European integration. Eventually, and most importantly, the notion of Euroscepticism has an ambivalent relationship to historical temporality. On the one hand, its roots in the post-Maastricht debates and its binary nature (pro- vs. anti-Europe) makes it quasi-obsolete with regard to complex and qualified present resistances to European integration. On the other hand, its contemporary flavour makes it anachronistic with respect to past opposition to Europe. Few authors have talked about Euroscepticism in the 1950s or qualified Charles de Gaulle as a Eurosceptic, in spite of his declared hostility towards supranationalism and the 'stateless technocrats' in Brussels.

As a third critical comment towards Euroscepticism, it is argued that its heavy normative dimension makes its use within the scientific field problematic. Indeed, its exclusively negative connotation made it a popular weapon in order to disqualify political rivals. L. Neumayer (2007) has for instance scrutinized how the Eurosceptic 'label' is used in party politics in Central and Eastern Europe. It therefore reflects strategic behaviour within competitive political fields. The use of the label is also determined by the degree of social acceptance towards critical discourse over the EU in a given political space or culture. While most politicians do not like to be called Eurosceptics, the Dutch politician Fritz Bolkestein had accepted being described as such, while he was the first in the Netherlands to voice resentment against the EU for being too supranational, too social and too costly (Harmsen, 2004). Ironically, more recently he accused opponents to his project for liberalization of services of being protectionists and Eurosceptics. Hence, when scholars qualify political actors as Eurosceptics, they inevitably contribute to discredit them. As a matter of fact, research on party-based Euroscepticism has focused almost exclusively on the hypothesis of a cleavage between radical Eurosceptic parties and mainstream pro-European parties. This has led to largely overlooking manifestations of hostility towards the EU within the latter, as A. Szczerbiak and P. Taggart themselves underline (2008, p. 8). In fact, since the definition of the essence of Euroscepticism was not possible, the term has been used as an adjective to qualify actors. This not only reinforces stigmatization, but also leads to the reification of objects under consideration: political parties are Eurosceptic or not. In contrast, research has proved that this varies over time and also within units under analysis. Eventually, even authors who are not fully satisfied with the notion of Euroscepticism still use it. This is evidence for the difficulties entailed in the search for a relevant alternative. An attempt to do so is nevertheless put forward here, while arguing that the study of resistances to European integration can tackle, certainly not all but at least the most significant pitfalls which affect the notion of Euroscepticism.

Resistances to Europe: New Analytical and Empirical Paths

A Tentative Definition

We define resistances as manifestations of hostility towards one (or several) aspect(s) of European integration perceived as a threat with respect to one's values.

Resistances focus on the gap between actors' perception of what the EU is and beliefs about what it should be. This offers a number of assets with respect to the pitfalls of the Euroscepticism approach. At their most basic level, these manifestations of hostility take the form of discursive (inter)actions. With respect to the disputed and changing notion of Euroscepticism, this definition can be used consistently over a very wide range of empirical situations. Actually, the term 'resistance(s)' is not new in the academic literature about European integration, either in history or political science. It was frequently used by authors who were reluctant to use the term of Euroscepticism in relationship to topics not connected to contemporary party politics. They found the term resistance more appropriate to talk about governments or social actors (Goldstone, 1998; Surel, 2000; Nicolaïdis & Schmidt, 2007; Höpner & Schäfer, 2007; Schmitter, 2008; Balme & Chabanet, 2008; Kriesi, 2008) and to picture hostility towards Europe as a polymorphous phenomenon. The notion of resistance was also used to analyze structural trends over the long term (Caporaso & Tarrow, 2008) and by a group of historians to encompass several historical contexts since the origins of the European project (Guieu et al., 2006). At the same time, while Euroscepticism remains mainly focused on political parties, the term resistances (in plural) is relevant to analyze the diverse nature of hostility towards integration, which was deemed necessary (Katz, 2008, p. 159). It applies to individual (politicians, or individual citizens) as well as to collective actors (national governments, national courts, unions, associations, etc.). It allows therefore a flexible and unified approach to diverse empirical realities.

More importantly, it allows the diverse subjective perceptions of European integration to be taken into account. It acknowledges that it is impossible to determine objectively the essence of European integration. This problem has recurrently affected the elaboration of typologies of Euroscepticism and the distinction between 'the principle of EU integration' (diffuse support) and the 'EU as it is (developing)' (its trajectory, specific support) remains an illusion. While Kopecky and Mudde (2002) consider that liberal market economy and supranationalism constitute the essence of integration, this remains questionable, since, for instance, not the principle of 'liberal market economy' but of 'social market economy' (article 3 TEU) is enshrined in the treaties. The question whether EU integration is more a supranational than an intergovernmental polity also raises controversies among political and social actors as well as scholars of the EU. It is therefore doubtful whether one can tell what is the 'EU as it is' and what will be its future trajectory. In her research about resistances against the European constitutional treaty in France and Germany, S. Heine (2008) has defined the different kinds of resistances according to their ideological referents on materialist and identity issues. Doing so, she distinguishes between Marxist, social democratic, cosmopolitan or Euro-patriotic resistances. However, it is also relevant to define them while considering the other term of the equation and to ask as R. Katz (2008, p. 155) does: 'what is it that Soft Eurosceptics oppose?' It is possible to identify recurrent contentious models, representations or ideal-types of Europe based on an enlarged Rokkanian perspective. We believe that much of the contention over integration deals with the EU as: i) a supranational 'super-state' versus a 'Europe of the nations'; ii) a Christian Europe versus a 'cosmopolitan Europe' or even a 'fortress Europe' versus a 'cosmopolitan Europe'; iii) the model of a 'social Europe' versus a

'(neo)liberal Europe'; iv) a 'military power Europe' versus a 'pacifist Europe'. At this stage, this list is neither closed nor exhaustive. Since the idea remains divisive among scholars that contention over European integration is actually rooted in a sociological dimension (Kriesi et al., 2008), these analytical couples shall not be defined as cleavages, but rather as normative models and counter-models of the EU which have both material and cultural aspects (Hooghe & Marks, 2009). This means there are no resistances to Europe in general, but to liberal Europe, social Europe, etc. Such a 'detour' through actors' perceptions and normative models allows resistances to be distinguished 'in kind' before being distinguished 'in degree' (Sartori, 1970). Actors do not resist to an objective and univocal state of the EU. They rather resist to constructed representations and amplified aspects of European integration in contexts where uncertainty with regard to the impact of EU policies or constitutionalization is often very high. For this reason, discursive representations of Europe are often entangled within well-known ideological schemata. In a second step, one should consider to what extent an actor is hostile to most aspects of integration and how consistently over time in order to assess the degree of resistance and avoid the levelling of all forms of resistances (hard and soft).

This brings us to the second important analytical asset offered by the notion of resistances. While the meaning of Euroscepticism remains marked by its vernacular context of origin and is hence quite inappropriate to a historical perspective, the study of resistances aims at identifying resistance to some models of Europe and the change or continuity thereof. The approach put forward does not seek to analyze a substantial phenomenon nor does it aim at qualifying actors and their nature. Rather, it focuses on explaining processes. It therefore does not have the static character displayed by Euroscepticism. These processes are diverse and can be latent or manifest, or, in other words, there are passive and active resistances. If one investigates for instance processes of cognitive appropriation of Europe by individual citizens in qualitative interviews, the form of resistance will be passive (when the person proves to be hostile towards the EU). But when the citizen votes against a treaty or against membership of his/her country in the EU, resistance becomes active. As far as mobilization by political organizations or groups is concerned, it is mostly about manifest and collective resistances. The shift from passive to active resistance is consistent with potential variation over time, which encourages focusing on 'conditions of activation' (Rozenberg, 2007) of resistances. It has been demonstrated (Crespy, 2008) that resistances to liberal Europe within the French Socialist Party crystallized again over the European constitutional treaty, having long remained latent under the leadership of François Mitterrand. Under such a definition, there are no Eurosceptic actors as such: every actor can potentially be involved in processes of resistance to the EU. This is consistent with, for instance, studies of Belgian political parties (Pilet & Van Haute, 2007) or unions (Verschueren, forthcoming) which are traditionally considered 'Europhile'. Furthermore, the notion of resistances shall be a tool for studying long term processes. It echoes, for instance, S. Bartolini's (2005) theory about the political de- or re-structuring of Europe over the long term. According to him, European integration constitutes a 'critical juncture' which opens a new era of transformation for the European political spaces in Europe. This process can be described as the transcending of territorial, political and economic boundaries with a subsequent modification in mechanisms of

interest representation, voice and loyalty which had been prevailing so far. In a similar vein, Y. Déloye (2000) considers European citizenship as an evolutive and non-linear concept implying deep re-organization of identities inherited from the past. The study of resistances to EU integration therefore aims at relocating the issue of Euroscepticism in the larger issue of conflict within political systems in mutation.

Last but not least, the notion of resistances is much less normative than Euroscepticism. The term 'resistance' has many meaningful connotations. It can nevertheless be argued that, since it is polysemic, the positive and negative connotations tend to cancel each other, thus providing a level of semantic neutrality. One has for instance to think about World War II. In Germany, debates over the meaning of resistance and the re-definition by Broszat triggered a vivid historio-graphic debate and contestation from all sides (Kershaw, 1997). Resistance can also have negative connotations. In the realm of politics, it often means objection to change and advocacy of the status quo and it can be associated with the idea of conservatism. While positive and negative connotations are entangled in social science, the use in terms of the EU might be closer to the meaning of the term in physics, namely mechanic resistance against another force (in movement). This echoes the perspectives developed by K. Polanyi as they have been recently applied to European integration by J. Caporaso and S. Tarrow (2008) in their reflections on the EU as a process of institutionalization of the liberal market economy. However, resistances are not to be a homogeneous phenomenon as the idea of movement (or counter-movement) suggests. Finally, because it is not specific to EU integration and has been used in other contexts, the notion of resistances tends to normalize the debate over EU integration.

Past and Present Resistances: Examples of Operationalization

While the notion of resistances relates to mobilizations for or against polarized representations of Europe, it can be useful to shed new light on past conflicts which have often been little theorized and under-researched. Furthermore, this approach allows continuity (or change) between resistances in the past and in the present to be analyzed. A full operationalization can, for instance, succeed through the conduct of a frame analysis – which has been developed in social movement research – focused on the models and counter-models of Europe mentioned above. The various couples of models are unarguably not at all hermetic to each other. Rather, they are often mixed or related. In this respect, the use of ideal-types shall help disentangling the various issues and identifying the dominant frames. The theorization of resistances through models and counter-models of Europe also implies some simplification of empirical historical reality. But, for that reason, it performs the task of going beyond the variety of historical contexts and the related conflicts within societies. Two examples are briefly presented in this section: resistances against a 'militaristic Europe' (versus a 'pacifist Europe') with the rejection of the European Defence Community and resistances against a 'liberal Europe' (versus a 'social Europe') with union mobilizations in the 1960s. These models of Europe are particularly interesting because they have had an important resonance in recent years. Resistances against a 'Christian Europe' versus a 'secular Europe' for instance would also deserve closer attention (Foret, 2009).

Opposition to the European Defence Community (EDC) in the early 1950s in France can be seen as a case of resistance to a 'Europe of military power'. Raymond Aron spoke of the 'Dreyfus Affair of the Fourth Republic' to underline that the conflict cross-cut all established political cleavages (Buton, 2004, p. 43). Most actors within the political realm – socialist movements, organizations of Resistance fighters or Christian-democrat political parties – were divided over the EDC. The issue of building a European defence force in the 1950s was closely related to the context of the Cold War. It opposed those who saw Europe as a rather neutral and pacifist force to those who favoured building Europe as a political and military power allied with the United States. The rearmament of Germany was unarguably the major concern of the French and Belgian socialist movements (Delwit, 1995, pp. 65, 204). However, the project of a European army was strongly connected to the role of Europe in a bipolar world, especially after the pacifist movement was strengthened in the context of the Korean War, decolonization and the nuclear arms race. In the Federal Republic of Germany, opinion was also divided, 'with the Socialists tapping into a groundswell of pacifism epitomized by the slogan *Ohnemich*' (Dinan, 2004, p. 59).

In spite of the dramatic changes brought about by the end of the Cold War in 1989 and the long normalization of German defence, the issue of a 'military Europe' and the 'transatlantization' of European defence has not disappeared from contemporary politics. It was for instance at stake in connection with the war in former Yugoslavia, or, more recently, in Iraq. While member states still enjoy great autonomy in deciding on defence and foreign policy, the issue of a 'military power Europe' has also fuelled opposition to the EU treaties. The pacifist argument for instance was important in the mobilization against the Lisbon treaty in Ireland. Some leftist groups claimed that the ratification of the treaty would force Ireland to abandon its pacifist tradition and invest in European defence (O'Brennan, 2009). The German radical left has also consistently criticized treaty provisions and policies aiming at strengthening European defence. *Die Linke* rejects the '*Militarisierung*' of the EU and treaty provisions on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) were a major reason for opposing the 'European Constitution' in 2005 (Hildebrandt, 2005, p. 54). Therefore, although the issues at stake and the actors involved change over time, contention over EU integration crystallizes on persisting models of Europe.

This is also true for the resistances against a 'liberal Europe' and a 'social Europe', a theme which, to a large extent, overlaps the capital–work cleavage. At first sight, it seems anachronistic to speak of a 'social Europe' in the 1950s. Although mobilization on this issue is not a continuous process, critical claims on a 'social deficit' of Europe were voiced by the trade unions as early as the Schuman Plan and during the first 15 years of European integration (Bührer, 2004; Pasture, 1998, 1999; Gobin, 1997). Studying trade unions' reactions towards European integration is particularly fruitful in two respects. Firstly, their disappointments regarding European institutions were commensurate with their ambitions, hence generating various representations over European integration (Pasture, 1998). Secondly, the unions constituted the main channels of mediation between workers and the European institutions. Their participation in the integration process guaranteed social peace and contributed to legitimizing the European supranational authorities confronted by the opposition of the Communists. While some trade unions' claims displayed a blurry idealism, Christian and Socialist unions shared the idea of

European collective bargaining (Verschueren, forthcoming). In this context, the proposal for a European status for miners was the most ambitious and potentially feasible project. In France, Belgium and Germany, mineworkers enjoyed special status after World War II. In the aftermath of the coal crisis in autumn 1958 and with the weakening of the Communist influence among the coalfield societies, the miners' vested interests were abolished. In response to the situation, the Christian and Socialist unions advocated European status for miners. This proposal enjoyed the support of the High Authority and the European Assembly. The slow progress of this project culminated with 25,000 mineworkers demonstrating in Dortmund on 4 July 1964 and demanding a Social Europe and a European status for mineworkers. The opposition by coal owners, on the one hand, and the French and the German governments, on the other, led to the withdrawal of this ambitious project. Far from being restricted to workers' organizations, the bitterness was shared with the Members of the European Assembly and within European networks such as the Socialist Movement for the United States of Europe. In May 1959, a European Labour Congress, held in Paris, brought together socialist politicians and trade unionists aiming to re-launch the federalist project. A main conclusion of this Congress was that European integration was increasingly ruled and distorted by 'pseudo-liberal forces'.[2] Beyond their disagreements, trade union leaders shared the fear that the integration process could lead to dismantling of social benefits gained after World War II. These fears were voiced during negotiations over the Treaty of Rome which remained deliberately ambiguous regarding social measures. While some unions had already expressed their disappointment earlier with respect to the weakness of social policies in the frame of the European Coal and Steal Community, the Treaty of Rome confirmed in their view the liberal turn taken by European integration (Pasture, 1998, pp. 372–373).

   Contention over a 'social' versus a 'liberal' Europe in the early years of integration has a particularly strong resonance today, for instance when looking at the conflict over the 'Bolkestein directive'. Between 2004 and 2006, the proposal for a directive on services liberalization in the EU triggered unprecedented levels of transnational mobilization (Crespy, 2009). Unions and left-wing political parties mobilized against the provisions which were deemed to entail wage and social dumping, to affect social protection of workers posted abroad and public services. While the Commission insisted that the proposed directive was merely actualizing the freedom to provide services enshrined in the 1957 treaty of Rome, it is interesting to see that the resistances against the 'liberal EU' in the name of a desired 'social EU' are not new either. Disappointment over the Treaty of Rome had brought the withdrawal of the unions onto the national level (Verschueren, forthcoming) in times which are often considered as a long stagnation of the integration process until the late 1980s. After a golden age of European social dialogue, which culminated with the 1996 Directive on posted workers, the unions are today increasingly resisting the social consequences of negative integration. Recent judgements of the ECJ – such as the Laval and Viking cases from December 2007 – are seen as particularly threatening for the provisions ruling industrial relations in the frame of the national states. Whereas the actors of the left in several countries (especially in Scandinavia and Germany) had long favoured the preservation of their national rules over Europeanization, there is today a Europe-wide consensus over a European directive

for regulating public services and even on European minimum wages. One might conclude that 'movements' and 'counter-movements' – or resistances – drawing the contours of Europe are articulated by persistent contradictory frames and representations of Europe through the time of integration, which seems to be more cyclical than linear.

Conclusion

The objective of this paper was to shed new light on how contention over European integration can be analyzed. We have particularly stressed the need for an interdisciplinary approach combining history and political science, while, we argue, the existing literature in these two areas displays important deficiencies which hinder the understanding of complex past and present hostility towards European integration. The historiography of European integration is mainly focused on the 'grand history' of Europe and has overlooked political and social forces of resistance to the integration process. Actually, both historians and political scientists have more or less implicitly assumed that contention over Europe was rather a contemporary issue which emerged in the early 1990s. In the realm of political science, the issue was mainly framed in terms of Euroscepticism. We have demonstrated that, in many respects, this notion has led to an analytical as well as normative deadlock. We therefore suggest that the notion of resistances is much better equipped to analyze continuity and change in hostility towards integration not only in space but also in time. Resistances to Europe shall be defined as manifestations of hostility towards one (or several) aspect(s) of European integration perceived as a threat with respect to one's values. This definition stresses the diversity of potentially involved actors as well as the diversity of their motives for opposing one or several aspects of integration. While considering actors' subjective perception of what the EU is and what it should be, it takes into account that, in many respects, the EU is a moving target. This perspective also avoids substantialism and static actor qualification since it seeks to analyze processes of resistance activation which can vary not only over space but also over time. Eventually, the a-temporal and polysemic nature of the term 'resistance' allows the issue of European integration to be de-specified and hence to be dealt with it in a much less normative manner. The study of resistances shall focus on (discursive) models and counter-models of Europe which can be identified and seem to grasp much of contentious debates over Europe. Eventually, we have attempted to give some hints for operationalization while dealing with two of these contradictory models of Europe and demonstrating the continuity of contentious themes beyond various historical contexts: namely the issue of 'Europe as a military power', and mobilization against a 'liberal Europe' and for a 'social Europe'. While the approach of resistances does not tackle all the challenges linked to theorization of resistances to European integration, it avoids most pitfalls which affect the study of Euroscepticism. Not only does the notion of resistances allow a consideration of the various forms of integration, but the inclusion of actors' perception in the definition is consistent with the fact that, in many respects, Europe is a 'moving target'. Furthermore, the interdisciplinary approach puts the novelty of contention over Europe into perspective and re-situates it in the wider realm of conflict within political systems in mutation. We hope this

can contribute usefully to the current debates over the contentious nature of European integration as well as to overcoming the overspecialization and fragmentation of knowledge implied by often artificial demarcation lines between academic disciplines.

Notes

[1] There are 4800 references for 'permissive consensus', and 672 references associating 'permissive consensus' and 'euroscepticism' in google.
[2] Archives of the *Fondation André Renard, Syndicalisme international, syndicalisme face à l'Europe*.

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